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Abstract:	This	study	investigates	a	state-level	panel	dataset	for	the	five	most	recent	U.S.	
Presidential	 elections,	 namely,	 2000,	 2004,	 2008,	 2012,	 and	 2016,	 for	 which	 all	 data	
needed	 to	 reflect	 all	 of	 the	 variables	 in	 the	 model	 are	 available.	 While	 the	 general	
objective	 is	 to	 shed	 further	 insights	 into	 identifying	 factors	 that	 in	 a	 contemporary	
setting	influence	the	aggregate	voter	participation	rate	in	such	elections,	the	emphasis	is	
on	the	impact	of	the	female	labor	force	participation	rate,	which	is	hypothesized,	ceteris	
paribus,	 to	 positively	 affect	 aggregate	 voter	 turnout.	 Several	 Cross	 Section	 Random	
Effects	 estimates	 are	 undertaken,	 each	 of	which	 supports	 the	 hypothesis.	 Indeed,	 the	
semi-log	 estimate	 implies	 that	 a	 one	 unit	 (one	 percentage	 point)	 higher	 level	 for	 the	
female	labor	force	participation	rate	in	a	state	is	associated	with	a	0.61%	higher	overall	
voter	turnout	in	the	state.	Although	the	nation’s	female	labor	force	participation	rate	in	
the	 U.S.	 has	 effectively	 stabilized,	 there	 is	 considerable	 interstate	 variation	 in	 this	
variable;	 thus,	 candidates	 for	 elected	 office	 in	 states	 with	 higher	 female	 labor	 force	
participation	rates	and/or	growing	female	labor	force	participation	rates	would	be	well	
advised	to	be	sensitive	to	the	needs	of	this	demographic	when	campaigning.		
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1 Introduction 
Although mitigated to a degree by a modest upward movement of 
voter turnout for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 general elections, concern 
regarding low and declining voter participation rates in the U.S., 
nevertheless, has frequently been expressed in the media and elsewhere. 
As Putnam (2000, p. 31) has stated, “With the singular exception of voting, 
American rates of political participation compare favorably with those in 
other democracies...” and that, since the 1960s, “We are reminded [during] 
each election cycle that fewer voters show up at the polls in America than 
in most other democracies…”. 
Arguably, at least in part because of such concerns, the objective of 
better understanding voter turnout and its causes have led to a significant 
scholarly literature. This has especially been the case following the 
introduction of the “rational voter model” (RVM) by Downs (1957). This 
research surge regarding voting is illustrated by a diverse, ongoing body 
of both empirical and, to a lesser degree, theoretical work by many 
scholars. This literature is very diverse in terms of both approach and 
subject matter considered. For instance, it includes theoretical modeling 
such as (1) that found in Riker and Ordeshook (1968), who endeavor to 
extend the model in Downs (1957) by adding to the basic RVM equation a 
term, D, reflecting one’s sense of civic duty, one’s satisfaction from voting, 
and one’s desire to affirm one’s partisanship or efficacy, modeling such as 
(2) that found in Ledyard (1984), where an elegant mathematical context 
for understanding the potential complexity of two-candidate elections is 
developed, and modeling such as that found in Tullock (2006), who 
investigates the expected benefits and costs to potential voters of going to 
the polls to vote. 
The voting literature also addresses a host of empirical issues that are 
found in varying degrees to be relevant to the decision to vote (Brody and 
Sniderman 1977; Schlozman and Verba 1979; Rosenstone 1982; Southwell 
1988; Cox and Munger 1989; Feather 1989; Radcliff 1992; Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Matsusaka 1993, 1995; Leighly 1996; Kirchgassner and Zu 
Himmern 1997; Grofman et al. 1998; Matsusaka and Palda 1999; Tolbert et 
al. 2001; Copeland and Laband 2002; Barreto et al. 2004; Tolbert and Smith 
2005; Cebula and Tullock 2006; Whitby 2007; Cebula 2008; Tolbert et al. 
2009; Gorecki 2009; Altman 2013; Cebula et al. 2013; Lee and Clark 2014; 
Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Lacombe et al. 2016). These studies warrant 
at least a brief description inasmuch as they form background for the 
present study. 
For example, several of the above studies investigate the impact of 
election closeness, i.e., “tight” elections, where the candidates are very 
close according to polls. For the most part, these studies (Cox and Munger 
1989; Kirchgassner and Zu Himmern 1997; Grofman et al. 1998; Gorecki 
2009; Cebula et al. 2013; Lacombe et al. 2016) find that if the polls reveal a 
tight enough election as to imply an uncertain outcome, many voters are 
more incentivized to go to the polls. 
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There is an empirical literature for the U.S. finding that the impact of 
the number of ballot referenda and/or initiatives on voter turnout is 
typically positive and statistically significant, especially if these forms of 
direct democracy on the ballot are emotionally charged (Matsusaka 1993, 
1995; Tolbert et al. 2001; Tolbert and Smith 2005; Cebula 2008; Tolbert et al. 
2009). Interestingly, however, this positive impact of direct democracy is 
not found to apply to certain other nations, such as Switzerland (Altman 
2013). Furthermore, in certain other studies, it has been hypothesized that 
unemployment and needing to deal with the demands and stresses of 
looking for gainful employment tend to reduce the degree of voter 
participation (Schlozman and Verba 1979; Rosenstone 1982). In these 
studies, being involuntarily unemployed is viewed as leading to lower 
self-esteem because of an implied failure to earn an income through 
gainful employment; moreover, being unemployed was viewed as 
reducing one’s status within the family unit (Feather 1989; Schlozman and 
Verba 1979); in addition, to the extent that the experience of being 
unemployed leads to lower levels of self-esteem and personal efficacy, the 
latter is argued to contribute to a general sense or feeling of apathy. Thus, 
in theory, unemployment is hypothesized as acting as a “demobilizing” 
influence over unemployed potential voters to exercise their right to vote, 
i.e., persons experiencing unemployment are arguably unlikely to become 
sufficiently motivated to make it a point to head to the polls on election 
day. Furthermore, Brody and Sniderman (1977) argue that to the extent 
that citizens perceive job loss as a personal problem with which they must 
cope and that they themselves must remedy, a job loss very likely will 
deter them from voting. 
Related to the impact of unemployment on voter participation, a study 
by (Rosenstone 1982; p. 26), who argues that, “When a person experiences 
economic adversity his scarce resources are spent on holding body and 
soul together – surviving – not on remote concerns like politics” and finds 
empirically that a greater degree of unemployment acts to depress voter 
participation. This finding in principle is consistent with a subsequent 
study of U.S. Congressional elections over the 1972-1984 time period by 
Southwell (1988) as well as a follow-up study by Rosenstone and Hansen 
(1993, p. 135), who hypothesize that, on a benefit/cost basis, those who are 
unemployed perceive higher net benefits for themselves in activities other 
than voting. Moreover, according to the findings in Radcliff (1992), a 
poorly performing/weak economy seemingly discourages voter turnout 
among those most adversely affected in the U.S. By contrast, two recent 
studies by Cebula (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014), in which it is 
argued on theoretical grounds that either a worsening economy, or simply 
a higher unemployment rate, exercises an impact that induces potential 
would-be voters to express concern and pursue remedies for their 
circumstances through the power of voting. Indeed, the empirical findings 
in Cebula (2008), who analyzes state-level data, and in Burden and 
Wichowsky (2014), who analyze county-level data, both imply that higher 
unemployment rates do motivate people, and not simply the unemployed 
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but also those who are employed but concerned about unemployment in 
the economy, to vote. 
Among the more recent and potentially very insightful developments 
in the literature on voter participation is the work by Copeland and 
Laband (2002), as well as the works by Barreto, et al. (2004), Cebula (2004), 
Whitby (2007), and Lee and Clark (2014), who have empirically 
investigated a theory of “expressive voting”. To some extent, the work by 
Copeland and Laband (2002), along with the works by Barreto et al. (2004), 
Cebula (2004), Whitby (2007), and Lee and Clark (2014), reflects the effort 
to introduce an alternative perspective as to why people vote, including 
the introduction of new demographic and non-demographic variables that 
may explain voting behavior. For example, Copeland and Laband (2002) 
use LOGIT techniques on longitudinal micro-level cross-section data for 
the years 1986,1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996 to provide support for the 
theory that people vote in order to express their feelings on a variety of 
issues, some economic, some not. Barreto et al. (2004) and Whitby (2007) 
find that certain minorities express their feelings of disenfranchisement 
from government in the U.S. by withholding their votes and only vote to 
express their voting power when a minority candidate matching their own 
minority status is on the ballot. After allowing for economic 
considerations such as inflation and income tax rates, Cebula (2004) finds 
time series support for the idea that the voter participation rate is affect by 
emotional voting behavior. Issues such as the Vietnam War, Watergate, 
and dissatisfaction with government are found to significantly affect voter 
turnout. Moreover, Lee and Clark (2014) carefully document how in their 
classic work, The Calculus of Consent, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
overlook their own contributions to the notion that people vote to express 
their feelings and to release emotional responses to various economic and 
social issues. Indeed, the efforts by Barreto et al. (2004), Cebula (2004), and 
Whitby (2007) are consistent with the two ways in which Matsusaka and 
Palda (1999, p. 442) suggest that future research can better explain voter 
behavior, namely: (1) to continue to search for new explanatory variables 
and to move away from reliance on traditional demographics such as age 
and income; and (2) to move toward the study of aggregated voting 
behavior, where individual idiosyncrasies will cancel each other out and 
allow the estimation of models with greater explanatory power. Also 
consistent with these suggestions, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Cebula 
and Tullock (2006), Tullock (2006), and Cebula and Meads (2008) 
introduce an aggregative “voter cost-benefit model” of aggregate voter 
behavior and provide empirical analysis as well. In addition, it is 
noteworthy that Lacombe et al. (2016) develop yet an alternative voter 
turnout perspective, namely, one focusing on the demand for votes.  In 
any case, the present study adopts a framework which effectively 
synthesizes the aggregative voter cost-benefit model with the 
expressive-voting model.    
Within the above background, the present study seeks to provide an 
analysis of the impact of the female labor force participation rate on the 
overall voter participation rate in U.S. Presidential elections. The 
Cebula	and	Alexander:	Female	Labor	Force	Participation	and	Voter	Turnout	
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hypothesis, which is further developed below, is that the higher the female 
labor force participation rate, the greater the expected benefits (to women) 
of engaging in the election process and hence the greater the percentage of 
the aggregate voter-eligible population that in fact will turn out to vote. 
This study focuses upon a panel data-set using state-level data for all 50 of 
the U.S. states for the Presidential elections of the 21st century to date for 
which dependable data for all of the variables in this analysis are fully 
available. In particular, in this analysis, data are available for the five 
Presidential election years of the 21st century, namely, the election cycle 
years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. The focus on state-level data reflects 
the role played by the Electoral College in the election of U.S. Presidents. 
This study provides estimates using the Cross Section Random Effects 
Model. Consistent support for the basic hypothesis is obtained across a 
variety of estimates. 
Reflecting the arguments and findings in the studies by Caporale and 
Poitras (2014), Cebula et al. (2013), Cebula et al. (2008), Huber and Kirchler 
(2013), Kahane (2009), Linzer 92013), and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), 
among others, in the U.S., Presidential elections are markedly different 
from mid-term elections in many respects, including voter interest and 
turnout and the factors that determine voter interest and turnout. In other 
words, it ordinarily is not strictly appropriate from either an 
economics/public choice or econometrics perspective to compare voter 
turnout determinants in Presidential elections with voter turnout in 
mid-term elections. Accordingly, this study focuses only upon recent U.S. 
Presidential election cycles. 
2 Methods and Data 
The framework for the analysis is one in which it is hypothesized that 
the proportion of the aggregate voter-eligible population that will actually 
vote, VPR, is an increasing function of the expected (perceived) gross 
benefits (EXPGRBENS) associated with expressing her/his feelings 
through voting, ceteris paribus, and a decreasing function of the expected 
(perceived) gross costs (EXPGRCOSTS) associated with expressing 
her/his feelings voting, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, it follows that: 
 𝑉𝑃𝑅 = 𝑓 (𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑆,𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑆)            (1) 
such that 𝑓 !"#$%&!'(! > 0   𝑓 !"#$%&'()(! < 0.                    (2) 
 
Clearly, this framework effectively synthesizes the aggregative voter 
cost-benefit model with the expressive-voting model. 
The present study adopts the general perspective that, given the 
complexity of the voting decision process, the concepts of the 
EXPGRBENS and EXPGRCOSTS necessarily require a very broad, very 
inclusive interpretation, i.e., allow the prospective voter to interpret these 
concepts from a viewpoint of using the voting process as a means by 
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which to express feelings and the intensity thereof. For instance, when 
there is an issue about which prospective voters feel strongly about, 
whether it is fundamentally economic in nature or fundamentally 
non-economic in nature, or when there is/are one or more candidates 
about whom prospective voters feel particularly strongly one way or 
another, voting may provide subjective benefits to the would-be voter 
because it has served as an emotional release or emotional outlet. In other 
words, it is argued here that people can use voting to express their more 
tangible/quantifiable views and/or express/vent their feelings and views 
(expressive voting). Thus, potentially, there exist a variety of feelings 
based upon EXPGRBENS and EXPGRCOSTS, which are evaluated by 
prospective voters, and the likelihood that any individual’s vote will alter 
an election outcome in the literal sense is not the primary consideration. 
Clearly, this perspective deviates from that of the RVM. 
2.1 The Female Labor Force Participation Rate 
Prior to the development of the central proposition of this study, i.e., 
the female labor force participation rate/voter participation rate 
(FLFPR/VPR) hypothesis, the concept of “intersectionality”, which was 
coined by Crenshaw (1991), is noteworthy. This term was developed in 
order to recognize the overlapping and inseparable social identities and 
socioeconomic influences of women. The greatest importance of 
intersectionality to the principal hypothesis in the present study is the fact 
that a woman’s identity and experiences as a woman and her identity and 
experiences as a person in the labor force cannot be separated. Thus, a 
woman’s gender and her labor force status cannot be separated in the 
voting booth due to the inherent intersectionality of her identity and 
experiences any more than they can be as she decides whether or not to 
vote. In other words, when a woman is not in the labor force, she is 
exposed to a variety of experiences and information that help to mold 
whether she will choose to vote and how. Once that same woman becomes 
a member of the labor force (and in all likelihood becomes employed), she 
is exposed to a variety of new experiences and information, including how 
her vote may help to influence (along with her working peers’ votes) her 
economic and non-economic well-being. In deciding whether to vote and 
subsequently how to vote, there is no way to separate her dual status as a 
woman and a labor force member-intersectionality applies.  
Accordingly, within this study, the principal hypothesis focuses upon 
the impact of the female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) on the 
aggregate voter participation rate (VPR), i.e., on the percentage of the 
voter-eligible population that actually votes during any given Presidential 
election cycle. The hypothesis being investigated argues that the 
magnitude of the female labor force participation rate may be influenced 
by the expected benefits from voting. Interestingly, over time, the FLFPR 
in the U.S. as a whole has risen quite sharply. For example, the FLFPR rose 
from 40.3% in 1966 to 60.0% in 1999 and 59.9% in 2000, although it 
marginally declined in the aggregate since attaining its peak to 
approximately 58.0% in 2012 (Council of Economic Advisors 2013, Table 
Cebula	and	Alexander:	Female	Labor	Force	Participation	and	Voter	Turnout	
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B-39). However, despite this effective plateauing of the FLFPR nationally 
in recent years, as shown in Table 1 of this study, the FLFPR nevertheless 
varies significantly across states. For example, while over the study period 
its mean is 60.024% and its standard deviation is 4.421%, its values range 
from a low of 48.0% to a high of 70.1%. 
 
Table	1.	Descriptive	Statistics	for	Variables	in	the	Model	 	 	
Variable	 Mean	 St.	Dev.	 Max.	 Min.	
VPR	 60.33	 6.75	 78.40	 41.70	
FLFPR	 	 60.02	 4.42	 70.30	 48.00	
COLLGRAD	 27.25	 4.97	 41.50	 15.30	
HSONLY	 59.66	 4.36	 69.40	 48.82	
UNRATE	 5.36	 1.65	 11.00	 2.20	
HISP	 9.79	 9.75	 48.00	 0.70	
AFROAM	 10.19	 9.50	 37.70	 0.30	
SANCTUARY	 2.81	 5.30	 47.00	 0.00	
CLOSE-EL	 0.29	 0.46	 1.00	 0.00	
EMCHARGED	 0.19	 0.39	 1.00	 0.00	
INC150PLUS	 4.91	 3.51	 19.60	 1.40	
OTHERMSRS	 3.27	 3.80	 26.00	 0.00	
MEDHHINC	 48933.00	 9362.00	 75675.00	 27243.00	
AGE65PLUS	 13.51	 2.03	 19.50	 5.70	
FLFPR65PLUS	 13.40	 2.10	 21.10	 10.00	
N	=	250	
	
Within the latter context, it is hypothesized in this study that the higher 
the percentage of the adult female population that is in the labor force, the 
higher the percentage of the female population that becomes better 
informed on (aware of) and arguably then more sensitive to a variety of 
labor market and other economic and non-economic issues that may 
influence the well-being of women, and, very often, their 
families/communities. This increased awareness of and sensitivity to such 
issues is likely to yield an increased interest in the potential benefits that 
their votes might yield them in election cycles, i.e., the greater the FLFPR, 
the greater the extent to which women in the workplace may perceive a 
greater desire and need to act on behalf of their own self-interest by 
participating to a greater degree in the electoral process. Thus, a higher 
female labor force participation rate arguably reflects the greater expected 
benefits from voting for working women and women actively seeking 
employment. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the higher the female 
labor force participation rate in state j (FLFPRj), the higher the expected 
gross benefits from voting in state j and, consequently, the higher the 
overall aggregate voter participation in that state, VPRj, ceteris paribus: 
	 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑗 =  𝑔 (𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑗,… )             (3a) 
such that 𝑔 !"!#$%! > 0                            (3b) 
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In addition, regarding the variable FLFPRj, by virtue of being in the 
workforce, and hence usually being employed, arguably there often is a 
greater opportunity for women to learn from fellow workers (as well as 
from supervisors and others with whom they come into contact on the job, 
possibly including “clients/customers”) to be well informed/better 
informed regarding economic and non-economic factors that are related to 
the voting process and issues that may be under debate/consideration in 
that voting process that might be of interest to female labor force 
participants. Hence, it is hypothesized that the greater the female labor 
force participation rate, the lower may be the costs associated with voting, 
especially as an “informed voter:” 
 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑗 =  ℎ (𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑗,… )            (4a) 
such that ℎ !"!#$%! < 0                            (4b) 
 
If this (FLFPR/VPR) hypothesis is valid, it may carry a particularly 
great relevance for elected officials, especially in states where the female 
labor force is higher and/or growing. Namely, it may be necessary to be 
sensitive to the needs of employed women and women seeking 
employment when campaigning for their support. 
2.2 Control Variables 
Naturally, the framework in this panel data study takes into account a 
variety of other factors that, on the aggregate level in each of the 50 states, 
potentially might influence the aggregate voter participation in each of 
those states. For example, it is argued that the higher the level of 
educational attainment, the greater may be the expected gross benefits 
from voting, ceteris paribus. Arguably, the higher one's educational 
attainment, the greater may be one's knowledge of and appreciation of the 
significance of participation per se in the electoral process in a democratic 
society. Indeed, higher levels of educational attainment may imply a 
higher level of understanding of those issues being decided or influenced 
through the election process as well as a better-informed electorate in 
terms of candidates' qualifications and character. Greater average levels of 
educational attainment may also lead to the subjective evaluation that 
voting per se yields benefits, regardless of the election outcome, insofar as 
voting may serve: (a) to create positive feelings about fulfilling one's “civic 
duty”, a phenomenon reflecting “social conditioning” (Tollison and 
Willett 1973, p. 61); (b) to create the feeling of helping to maintain the 
vitality and survival of the democratic process, in part, by obfuscating the 
free-rider (Campbell et al. 1960); and (c) to create the feeling of helping to 
clarify the degree to which election victors (and the political parties with 
which they are affiliated) can interpret their victories as either only 
marginal or as a de facto“ mandates” for implementing espoused 
policies/party platforms. 
In this study, educational attainment in each state is measured in two 
ways: (1) as the percentage of the population in each state age 25 and older 
Cebula	and	Alexander:	Female	Labor	Force	Participation	and	Voter	Turnout	
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with at least a bachelor degree (COLLGRADj) and (2) as the percentage of 
the population age 25 and older with only a high school diploma 
(HSONLYj). It is hypothesized that the greater the percentage of the 
population in state j with at least a bachelor degree (COLLGRADj) or with 
only a high school diploma (HSONLYj), the higher the expected gross 
benefits from voting in state j (and, consequently, the higher the overall 
percentage of eligible voters in state j that will vote, i.e., the higher the 
aggregate voter participation rate, VPRj, in the state), ceteris paribus 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Monroe 1977; Huber and Stephens 1992). 
Additionally, it is hypothesized in this study that the more poorly a 
state's economy is performing, i.e., the higher the percentage 
unemployment rate in a state, the greater the interest the public in the 
state may have in the outcome of a major election. If in fact a state's 
unemployment rate is perceived by the public as “excessive,” then 
would-be eligible voters, be they employed but concerned over high and 
possibly persistent future unemployment, or be they involuntarily 
unemployed persons who are angry about their joblessness, may wish to 
express their dissatisfaction with the existing high unemployment rate 
and/or to express their preferences for change at some level(s) of 
government in order to improve future employment prospects. Indeed, a 
“high” unemployment rate could engender fears regarding future 
unemployment prospects, not only among the currently unemployed but 
also among the current employed (Cebula 2008; Burden and Wichowsky 
2014). This fear might take the form either of an expected worsening of the 
unemployment rate or simply an expected unsatisfactory rate of 
improvement in the unemployment rate. Accordingly, it is hypothesized 
that the higher the unemployment rate in state j (UNRATEj), the greater 
the expected gross benefits from voting in the state as the public uses 
voting to express fears and concerns regarding job losses and/or to 
express preferences for more effective public economic policies or elected 
officials; hence, VPRj is hypothesized to be an increasing function of 
UNRATEj, ceteris paribus. This perspective is compatible with that found 
in Cebula (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014), although at odds 
with certain earlier studies, such as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). 
Next, the focus turns to the two largest minority groups in the U.S., 
Hispanics and Afro-Americans. Regarding these demographics, consider 
the argument in Barreto et al. (2004), namely, that if would-be voters feel 
politically disenfranchised from their government because of their 
perceptions that government is either unresponsive to their needs or that 
the election process is unresponsive to their importance, voter apathy 
increases. In such a circumstance, this apathy towards voting is directly a 
consequence of perceived low, if not zero, gross benefits from voting. 
These low or zero gross benefits from voting must also be considered 
within the presence of non-zero costs to voting, including the value of 
time and/or lost income and/or other costs that would be incurred in 
order to vote, which in tandem can create near-zero or even negative net 
benefits from voting. Arguably, this perspective would be expected of any 
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person, persons, or group of persons that perceives itself as not being 
politically advocated on behalf of by elected officials. 
Consider now the finding that, according to Barreto et al. (2004), the 
Hispanic community is significantly underrepresented in elected positions 
across the entire political spectrum. Moreover, for the Hispanic 
community, consider the fact that in all five of the general elections being 
studied here, namely, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016, neither major 
political party in the U.S., i.e., neither the Democratic nor Republican 
party, nominated a Hispanic candidate for either the office of President or 
the office of Vice President. Consequently, given the fact that the expected 
gross benefits for voting for Hispanics were very small if not effectively 
zero whereas there were/are non-zero costs to voting, it is hypothesized 
in this study that the greater the percentage of the population in state j that 
is Hispanic (HISPj), the lower the aggregate expected net benefits from 
voting in state j and hence the lower the aggregate voter participation rate 
in the state, ceteris paribus.  
By contrast, in both 2008 and 2012, the Democratic Party nominated an 
Afro-American candidate, Barack Obama, for President. Consequently, it 
is hypothesized that, for Afro-Americans, the expected gross benefit of 
voting would presumably have been increased by his candidacy and for 
many it would accordingly have become either positive or more positive 
than was previously the case, so that across the nation as a whole, a higher 
voter participation rate among Afro-Americans would have been 
experienced and hence a higher aggregate overall voter turnout would 
have become expected, ceteris paribus. Thus, from a geographic 
perspective, states having higher percentages of their population 
consisting of Afro-Americans would be expected to have had a higher 
aggregate overall voter participation rate in 2008 and 2012 because the 
expected benefits from voting would be greater, ceteris paribus. This 
argument is consistent with the empirical finding for the states of 
Louisiana and South Carolina in Whitby (2007) of a positive association 
between Afro-American officeholders and the voter participation rate of 
Afro-Americans. Letting the symbol AFROAMj indicate the percentage of 
the population in state j that is classified as being Afro-American, it 
follows that the greater the percentage of the population in state j that is 
Afro-American, at least for the years 2008 and 2012, when Barack Obama 
was a candidate, when he still was serving as President, the higher the 
value of the perceived gross benefits for Afro-Americans from voting in 
the state and hence the higher the Afro-American voter turnout and 
consequently the higher the aggregate voter turnout in state j, ceteris 
paribus. On the other hand, since there was no Afro-American major party 
Presidential (or Vice Presidential) candidate in the election cycles for the 
years 2000, 2004 and 2016, for those years, the higher the percentage of the 
population in state j that was Afro-American, arguably the lower the 
overall voter turnout, ceteris paribus, as a reflection of feelings of political 
disenfranchisement in combination with non-zero costs of voting. 
Accordingly, the 2000, 2004 and 2016 election-choice experiences very 
likely mitigated the expected experiences for 2008 and 2012, so that the net 
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impact of a higher percentage of the population in state j that was 
Afro-American over the combined 2000/2004/2008/2012/2016 study 
period is a priori unknown. 
As an additional consideration, the variable SANCTUARYj, defined as 
the number of Sanctuary cities in state j in any given (relevant) year, also 
is introduced as a control variable. The term “Sanctuary city” refers to a 
city that does not report the presence and number of undocumented 
immigrants to federal authorities. It has been found that states having a 
higher number of Sanctuary cities tend to be more politically active in 
recruiting potential voters to go to the polls by encouraging them to 
recognize the political power they can wield by voting, i.e., by educating 
them of the potential benefits of voting (Congressional Research Service, 
2006; Ohio Jobs and Justice PAC, 2016). Consequently, the greater the 
number of Sanctuary cities in a state, the greater the aggregate voter 
participation rate in the state, ceteris paribus. 
Next, two expressly “public-choice variables” are introduced into the 
model. The first of these variables is the number of emotionally charged 
statewide referenda and initiatives on the ballot in state j in year t. It has 
been observed that the greater the number of statewide referenda and 
initiatives involving “emotionally charged” issues such as (1) abortion and 
(2) same-sex marriage, as well as the (3) death penalty and the (4) 
legalization of marijuana usage, may act to elevate voter participation 
since the act of voting on such issues can be perceived as “empowering,” 
i.e., increasing the expected gross benefits of voting and hence the 
expected net benefits thereof, ceteris paribus. The variable EMCHARGEDjt 
is the number of emotionally charged (as defined above, by items 1 
through 4) statewide referenda and initiatives on the ballot in state j in 
year t. It is hypothesized that the voter participation rate is an increasing 
function of EMCHARGEDjt, ceteris paribus, as would be expected based 
on previous studies (Matsusaka 1993, 1995; Tolbert et al. 2001; Waters 
2003, p. xix; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004; Tolbert and Smith 2005; Lacey 
2005; Cebula 2008; Tolbert et al. 2009; Altman 2013; Hinnerich and 
Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014). The other public-choice variable is a dummy 
(binary) variable, CLOSE-ELjt, one that reflects the relative closeness 
between Presidential candidates in state j in year t. In particular, the 
variable CLOSE-ELjt = 1 when American Research Group polling (2017) 
indicates a voting margin between the leading two Presidential candidates 
for likely voters of less than 5% (in absolute value) during the third week 
of October of the Presidential election year, whereas CLOSE-ELjt = 0 
otherwise. Following the benefit-cost model in equation (1) above, it is 
expected that the more competitive the Presidential election in any given 
state is, according to the polls, the greater the expected benefit from voting 
and hence the greater the voter participation rate, ceteris paribus. 
Accordingly, one is more likely to vote in an election where the candidates 
are running very closely according to the polls than in an election where 
the outcome is a foregone conclusion, ceteris paribus (Kirchgassner and 
Zu Himmern 1997; Grofman et al. 1998; Gorecki 2009; Lacombe et al. 
2016). Stated in different terms, when in any given state the poll-forecasted 
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outcome in a Presidential election is very close, i.e., the margin between 
the candidates is sufficiently small as to make the outcome uncertain, the 
probability that those voter-eligible persons who feel strongly about the 
outcome will actually vote increases because voting is an opportunity to 
express feelings when it is more likely to help make a difference. 
According to the voter model developed in Lacombe et al. (2016), 
election closeness positively influences voter participation not only by 
elevating the probability that a single vote could be “pivotal” but also 
because closer elections elevate expected payoffs to political candidates.  
As observed in Lacombe et al. (2016, p. 174) “candidates and their 
campaign operatives offer incentives to increase electioneering efforts in 
tight races…an additional vote has a greater effect at the margin on the 
probability of victory, increasing the expected net benefit of winning even 
if the additional effort does not directly affect individual voting 
decisions”. 
Interestingly, in Presidential elections (as opposed to mid-term 
elections), for individual states in which the general elections are “close”, 
Cebula et al. (2013, p. 3735) offer “the battleground voting hypothesis”, 
which argues that “the greater the degree to which a given state is a 
battleground state, the greater the expected benefits from voting in that 
state and hence the greater the turnout in that state”. The empirical results 
suggest that the “battleground state effect” generates an average of 7.8 
additional percentage points in voter participation in Presidential elections 
over the period 1964–2008 for those states at the top of the scale.  Finally, 
Carporale and Poitras (2014, p. 3637) analyze a time series model of voter 
turnout for 34 U.S. Presidential elections, and find the expected closeness 
of the outcome exercises a positive and statistically significant influence on 
the aggregate voter participation rate.  
Based on the considerations provided above, equation (3a) now 
becomes the following: 
 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐵𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑗 =  𝑔 (𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑗,𝐻𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑗,  𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑀𝑗, 𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝐷𝑗,𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝐸𝐿𝑗)           (5)  
 𝑔 !"!#$%! > 0    𝑔 !"##$%&'(! > 0     𝑔 !!"#$%&! > 0       𝑔 !"#$%&'! > 0     𝑔 !"#$%! < 0        
 𝑔 !!"#$%!! ≈  0    𝑔 !"#$%&"'()! > 0     𝑔 !"#$%&'!()! > 0       𝑔 !"#$%!!"#! > 0                                                 (6) 
 
Next, the expected gross costs of voting are considered. In addition to 
the role of variable FLFPRj, as discussed above and in equation (4a) and 
relationship (4b), another factor that may influence the expected gross and 
hence net benefits of voting is family income. In particular, Cebula and 
Tullock (2006) and Cebula (2008) suggest that there is a potential negative 
relationship between the expected gross cost of the act of voting and 
family income, namely, so long as educational attainment has been 
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adequately accounted for, the higher the family income level, the higher 
the opportunity cost of voting may be, so that the incentive to “free-ride” 
may increase. Consider now the variable INC150PLUSj, defined here as 
the percentage of the resident households in state j with an income in 
excess of $150,000 annually. In at least some cases, higher income people 
thusly identified may be so immersed in their work endeavors (their 
pursuit of earnings/income) that they find that they simply have neither 
the time to be well enough informed voters nor the actual time to vote.  
Hence, from this perspective, it is hypothesized that the higher the value 
of INC150PLUSj, the higher the expected gross cost of voting in state j, 
ceteris paribus.    
Furthermore, there often are many ballot measures (referenda and 
initiatives) aside from those that are “emotionally charged”. As revealed 
in Table 1, on the average, in Presidential elections there are 3.268 “other” 
ballot measures that voters can ponder and vote upon, OTHERMSRSjt. 
Indeed, this number of ballot measures far exceeds the average number of 
emotionally charged ballot measures of 0.188. Clearly, in order to be 
sufficiently well informed to actually vote on ballot measures in the 
OTHERMSRSjt category requires time and effort and hence imposes a cost 
upon prospective voters. Consequently, it is argued in this study that the 
greater the number of non-emotionally charged ballot measures in state j 
during any Presidential election cycle, as defined here (OTHERMSRSj), the 
greater the expected costs of voting, ceteris paribus. 
Hence, it follows that equation (4a) becomes:  
 𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐺𝑅𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑆 =  ℎ(𝐼𝑁𝐶150𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆𝑗,𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑗)     (7) 
 
whereas (4B) becomes: 
 ℎ !"#!"#!"#$%! > 0       ℎ !"!#$%! < 0     ℎ !"#$%&'%'(! > 0 .      (8)  
              
2.3 The Consolidate Model 
Substituting from (5), (6), (7) and (8) into (1) and (2) yields the model to 
be estimated initially in this study, namely, equation (9), along with the 
accompanying relationships impounded in (10) below:  
 𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑗 =  𝑓(𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑗,𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑗,𝐻𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑗,𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑀𝑗,  SANCTUARYj,𝑀𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝐷𝑗,𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝐸𝐿𝑗,  𝐼𝑁𝐶150𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆𝑗,𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑗)               (9) 
 
where it is hypothesized, on balance, that: 
 𝑓 !"!#$%! > 0       𝑓 !"##$%&'! > 0     𝑓 !"#$%&'! > 0   𝑓 !"#$%&'! > 0  𝑓 !"#$%! < 0   𝑓 !"#$!%&! ≤  0       𝑓!"#$%&"'()! > 0     𝑓 !"#$%&'!()! > 0   𝑓!"#$%!!"!! > 0    𝑓 !"#$%&'()*+! < 0       𝑓!"#$%&'%'(! < 0.                         (10) 
 
REVIEW	OF	ECONOMICS	AND	INSTITUTIONS	Vol.	8,	Issue	2,	Fall-Winter	2017,	Article	3	
 
Copyright © 2017 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved. 
 
14	
As discussed in the text above and represented in eq. (10), the sign on 𝑓 !"#$!%&! > 0 is hypothesized to be positive for the study period, but the 
possibility of a net ambiguous/a priori unknown outcome cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. 
3 Results 
The empirical estimation is based on the model expressed in equation 
(9) and in (10) above. The balanced regional (state-level) panel data reflect 
the five Presidential election-year cycles of the 21st century to date, 
namely, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016, with the study period 
encompassing those years that reflect the present availability of the data 
needed for all of the variables in the model. For example, data for the 
variable INC150PLUSj are unavailable prior to the year 1999. 
In order to avoid simultaneity issues, the explanatory variables (aside 
from the three public choice variables, all of which were placed on the 
ballot during each election cycle year but nevertheless prior to Election 
Day) are lagged one year. Thus, on the one hand, the dependent variable, 
VPRjt, represents the voter participation rate, expressed as a percentage of 
the population eligible to vote in state j in election year t. On the other 
hand, remaining variables (except for EMCHARGEDj, CLOSE-ELj, and 
OTHERMSRSj) are all lagged in the estimations. 
Expressed in linear form, with the time lags (t-1) included where 
appropriate, equation (9) above is provided in equation (11) below: 𝑉𝑃𝑅!"  =  𝑥! + 𝑥! 𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐻𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑌!"!!  + 𝑥! 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑀!"!! + 𝑥! 𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝑅𝑌!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝐷!" + 𝑥! 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝐸𝐿!"  +  𝑥!"  𝐼𝑁𝐶150𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆!"!!   + 𝑥!!  𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑆!"  + 𝜖!"                         (11) 
 
where 𝑥! is the constant, 𝑥!,…, 𝑥!! are the coefficients, and 𝜖!"  is the 
error term.  
The data for the variables expressed above cover the 50 states, with 
Washington, D.C. excluded from the study since it is not a state. For the 
interested reader, descriptive statistics in the forms of means and standard 
deviations as well as maximum values and minimum values for all the 
variables in the analysis are provided in Table 1. Data sources for all of the 
variables in this study are provided in Table 2. Performing the Hausman 
(1978) specification test revealed a p-value = 0.0763, so that the study 
adopted the Random Effects Model rather than the Fixed Effects Model 
(Kennedy 2003, pp. 305-307). 
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Table	2.	 	 Variables	and	Data	Sources	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Variables	 Sources	
VPR	 Percentage	of	Eligible	Voter	Population	That	Voted	 	
	 Bipartisan	Policy	Center	(2014);	United	States	Election	Project	(2017).	 	
FLFPR	 	 Female	Labor	Force	Participation	Rate	
FLFPR65PLUS	 Female	Labor	Force	Participation	Rate	for	Age	65	and	Older	 	
UNRATE	 	 Unemployment	Rate	 	
	
U.S.	Department	of	Labor.	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(2016);	U.S.	Department	of	
Commerce	(2013).	
INC150PLUS	 	 	 	 	 	Percentage	of	Households	with	Annual	Income	of	$150,000	or	Higher	
MEDHHINC	 Median	Household	Income	
	 U.S.	Census	Bureau.	 	 American	Community	Survey	(2016C).	 	
AFAM	 	 Percentage	of	Population	That	Was	African-American	 	
HISP	 	 	 Percentage	of	Population	That	Was	Hispanic	
AGE65PLUS	 Percentage	of	the	Population	Age	65	and	Older	 	
	 U.S.	Census	Bureau.	American	Community	Survey	(2016B).	 	
COLLGRAD	 	 	 Percentage	of	Population	Age	25	and	over	with	Bachelor	Degree	or	Higher	
HSONLY	 Percentage	of	Population	Age	25	and	over	with	a	High	School	Diploma	Only	
	 U.S.	Census	Bureau.	American	Community	Survey	(2016A).	 	
EMCHARGED	 Number	of	Emotionally	Charged	Ballot	Items	
CLOSE-EL	 Relative	Closeness	on	Presidential	Candidates	(Binary)	
OTHERMSRS	 Number	of	Other	(Non-emotionally	charged)	Ballot	Measures	
	 American	Research	Group	(2017)	
SANCTUARY	
Number	of	Sanctuary	Cities	 	
Congressional	Research	Service	(2006);	Ohio	Jobs	and	Justice	PAC	(2016)	
VPR	 Percentage	of	Eligible	Voter	Population	That	Voted	 	
	 Bipartisan	Policy	Center	(2014);	United	States	Election	Project	(2017).	 	
FLFPR	 	 Female	Labor	Force	Participation	Rate	
FLFPR65PLUS	 Female	Labor	Force	Participation	Rate	for	Age	65	and	Older	 	
UNRATE	 	 Unemployment	Rate	 	
	
U.S.	Department	of	Labor.	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(2016);	U.S.	Department	of	
Commerce	(2013).	
3.1 Initial Estimation Results  
Before proceeding to the estimation results, the issue of a potential 
multi-collinearity problem is considered. In order to assess this issue, 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were computed for each of the 
explanatory variables in this initial model (as well as for each of the 
explanatory variables in the two variants on this initial model shown later 
in this study). While VIFs can provide interesting insights into the 
existence of multi-collinearity, issues involving the potential inappropriate 
interpretation of VIFs warrant brief attention. For example, as O’Brien 
(2007, p. 673) observes that: “The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and 
tolerance are both widely used measures of the degree of 
multi-collinearity of the ith independent variable with the other 
independent variables in a regression model. Unfortunately, several rules 
of thumb – most commonly the rule of 10 – associated with VIF are 
regarded by many practitioners as a sign of severe or serious 
multi-collinearity”. O’Brien (2007, p. 673) further notes that “When [the] 
VIF reaches these threshold values researchers often attempt to reduce the 
collinearity by eliminating one or more variables from their analysis; using 
Ridge Regression to analyze their data; or combining two or more 
independent variables into a single index. These techniques for curing 
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problems associated with multi-collinearity can create problems more 
serious than those they solve”. O’Brien (2007, p. 673) also argues that it is 
noteworthy that “Values of the VIF of 10, 20, 40, or even higher do not, by 
themselves, discount the results of regression analyses, call for the 
elimination of one or more independent variables from the analysis, 
suggest the use of Ridge Regression, or require combining of independent 
variable into a single index”. Thus, even if high VIF values were obtained 
for our model, they might not constitute a problem. 
Similarly, Allison (2012) observes that “Most data analysts know that 
multicollinearity is not a good thing. But many do not realize that there 
are several situations in which multicollinearity can be safely ignored”. 
For example, Allison (2012) notes that multicollinearity “is only a problem 
for the variables that are collinear. It increases the standard errors of their 
coefficients, and it may make those coefficients unstable in several ways. 
But so long as the collinear variables are only used as control variables, 
and they are not collinear with your variables of interest, there’s no 
problem. The coefficients of the variables of interest are not affected, and 
the performance of the control variables as controls is not impaired”. 
With these observations as background, it is interesting to note that the 
VIFs obtained for the initial model in Table 3 are in all cases not at all 
suggestive of multi-collinearity because they are all less than 4.0.  
Table	3.	The	Variance	Inflation	Factors	
Variable	 VIF	
FLFPR	 1.76	
COLLGRAD	 3.65	
HSONLY	 2.77	
UNRATE	 1.72	
HISP	 1.82	
AFROAM	 1.53	
SANCTUARY	 1.66	
EMCHARGED	 1.07	
CLOSE-EL	 1.03	
INC150PLUS	 2.76	
OTHERMSRS	 1.06	
N	=	250	 	
 
Moreover, this is true not only for the control variables but also for the 
key explanatory variable, the percentage female labor force participation 
rate, whose VIF is only 1.76. Since in all cases, the VIFs are less than 4.0, 
the absence of a multi-collinearity problem in this model (Greene, 2012, 
Kennedy, 2003; O’Brien, 2007; Rogerson, 2001) is established. 
Proceeding, then, the Cross Section Random Effects estimation of 
equation (11) is provided in Table 4, where the coefficients, standard 
errors, t-values, and probability values are all provided. As shown in 
Table 4, the signs on all 11 of the estimated coefficients are as 
hypothesized.  In addition, six of these coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, and two are statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The coefficient of determination is 0.53, so that the model explains 
more than half of the variation in the voter participation rate. Finally, the 
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F-statistic (12.47) is statistically significant at the 1% level, attesting to the 
overall strength of the model. 
Table	4.	Initial	Cross	Section	Random	Effects	(LHS	=	VPR)	
Explanatory	Variables	 Coefficient	 St.	Err.	 t-value	 Prob.	
FLFPR	 0.315***	 0.115	 2.73	 0.0068	
COLLGRAD	 1.011***	 0.152	 6.67	 0.0000	
HSONLY	 0.442***	 0.168	 2.64	 0.0088	
UNRATE	 0.565***	 0.191	 2.96	 0.0034	
HISP	 -0.148**	 0.068	 -2.14	 0.0331	
AFROAM	 0.034	 0.069	 0.49	 0.6280	
SANCTUARY	 0.182**	 0.079	 2.28	 0.0232	
EMCHARGED	 0.782	 0.632	 1.24	 0.2175	
CLOSE-EL	 2.499***	 0.626	 3.99	 0.0001	
INC150PLUS	 -0.346***	 0.112	 -3.09	 0.0022	
OTHERMSRS	 0.110	 0.084	 -1.31	 0.1924	
Constant	 -13.750	 	 	 	Periods,	5:	2000,	2004,	2008,	2012,	2016	
	 	 	 	N	=	250	
	 	 	 	F-Statistic	=	12.47***	
	 	 	 	R2	=	0.54	
	 	 	 	Hausman	 0.0763	
	 	 	***Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level;	**statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	
 
According to the estimation results, then, the overall voter participation 
rate among the voter-eligible population in the Presidential elections of 
the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 was an increasing function of 
(was positively associated with) the female labor force participation rate. 
In particular, the result reflecting the central hypothesis being investigated 
in this study indicates at the 1% statistical significance level that aggregate 
voter turnout in state j was an increasing function of the female labor force 
participation rate in the state. Thus, in this linear specification, it appears 
that on average an increase in the female labor force participation rate 
would elevate the overall voter participation rate among eligible voters. 
This finding provides empirical support for the fundamental hypothesis 
proffered in this study. 
As for the control variables in the model (for the interested reader), the 
Random Effects estimation results shown in Table 4 imply that the overall 
voter participation rate in state j was (as hypothesized above) an 
increasing function of (positively associated with) the percent of the 
population age 25 and older in the state with at least a bachelor degree, the 
percentage of the population in the state with only a high school diploma, 
the number of Sanctuary cities (as a reflection of the degree of political 
activism) found in the state, the percentage unemployment rate in the 
state, and closeness between the two major party Presidential candidates 
in the state. In addition, it was found that the overall voter participation 
rate in state j was a decreasing function of (negatively associated with) the 
percent of the population in the state that was Hispanic and the 
percentage of households residing in the state having an annual income in 
excess of $150,000. By contrast, the estimated coefficients on the 
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AFROAMjt-1, EMCHARGEDjt, and OTHERMSRSjt variables failed to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level. 
3.2 Robustness Testing  
A common exercise in empirical studies is a robustness check, wherein 
one investigates how certain "core" regression coefficient estimates behave 
when the regression specification is modified by adding or deleting 
explanatory variables  (Greene 2012; Kennedy 2003; Lu and White 2014; 
Rogerson 2001). Attention is now focused upon the results shown in Table 
5. 
In the top part of Table 5, the results of the Random Effects estimation 
of the model for the coefficient on the FLFPRt-1 variable and its t-statistic, 
as well as the new values for the estimation F-statistic and R2, are 
provided as one variable at a time is removed from the model [see column 
(a)], only in the following row to be reinserted into the equation while a 
different variable is deleted. 
Table	5.	Robustness	Checking	
Deleting	One	Variable	at	a	Time	
	 	 	 	(a)	 (b)	 (c)	 (d)	 (e)	
Row/Variable	 	 FLFPR	Coefficient	 	 	 FLFPR	t-statistic	 	 	Equation	F-statistic	 R2	 	
1	COLLGRAD	 0.455***	 3.81	 7.56***	 0.40	
2	HSONLY	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 0.304***	 2.62	 12.54***	 0.49	
3	CLOSE-EL	 0.309***	 2.6	 11.21***	 0.48	
4	EMCHARGED	 	 0.322***	 2.8	 13.67***	 0.53	
5	HISP	 0.36***	 3.13	 12.70***	 0.50	
6	INC150PLUS	 0.46***	 4.29	 12.39***	 0.52	
7	SANCTUARY	 0.31***	 2.65	 12.69***	 0.51	
8	OTHERMSRS	 0.311***	 2.71	 13.68***	 0.53	
9	UNRATE	 0.24**	 2.16	 24.97***	 0.53	
10	AFROAM	 0.301***	 2.71	 13.78***	 0.53	
Adding	One	Variable	at	a	Time	
	 	 	 	(a)	 (b)	 (c)	 (d)	 (e)	
Row/Variable	 	 FLFPR	Coefficient	 	 	 FLFPR	t-statistic	 	 	Equation	F-statistic	 R2	 	
11	MEDHHINC	 0.313***	 2.69	 11.31***	 0.53	
12	MEDHHINCSQ	 0.311***	 2.67	 11.30***	 0.53	
13	AGE65PLUS	 0.31**	 2.4	 11.34***	 0.53	
***Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level;	**statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	
 
Thus, in the first row of Table 5, the variable COLLGRAD is removed, 
while the remaining variables in the model are unchanged [see equation 
(11)]. As shown in row (1) of Table 5, following the Random Effects 
estimation of the model in this specification, the positive coefficient on the 
FLFPRt-1 variable remains statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas 
the estimation F-statistic (row 1, column d) also remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In row (2) of Table 5, the variable COLLGRAD 
has been returned to the estimating equation but the variable HSONLY 
has been removed. Once again, after the Random Effects estimation of the 
resulting specification, the removal of variable HSONLY still leaves the 
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positively signed estimated FLFPR variable (as well as the equation 
F-statistic) statistically significant at the 1% level. Indeed, as shown in each 
and every row of the top section of Table 5, no matter which one of the ten 
non-FLFPR variables is deleted (one at a time) and subsequently 
reinserted, the female labor force participation rate variable remains 
statistically significant (at the 1% level in nine cases and at the 5% level in 
the remaining case) and the equation F-statistic remains statistically 
significant (at the 1% level in all ten cases) after the Random Effects 
estimation. Similarly, in bottom part of Table 5, three different explanatory 
variables are each separately added to the basic model (11) one at a time 
and then subsequently deleted for the Random Effects estimation reflected 
in the following row. These additional variables are, as follows: 
MEDHHINC (median household income), as suggested in Campbell et al. 
(1960), and more recently by Caporale and Poitrasa (2014), among others; 
MEDHHINCSQ, median household income squared, as implied at some 
level in Cebula et al. (2008) and Burden and Wichowsky (2014); and 
AGE65PLUS (the percentage of the population age 65 and older), as 
suggested, e.g., in Durden and Gaynor (1987), Tullock (2006), and Cebula 
et al. (2008). In these additional Random Effects estimates, each of which 
had only the one specified additional variable added to it, the estimated 
t-statistic on the positively signed female labor force participation rate 
(FLFPR) coefficient remains statistically significant, at the 1% level in two 
cases and at the 5% level in the other case, whereas the accompanying 
estimation F-statistic remained statistically significant at the 1% level in all 
three cases. Thus, these tests, like those in the top section of Table 5, 
provide consistent empirical support for the robustness of the estimation 
finding that the voter participation rate across the five Presidential 
elections of the 21st century to date was an increasing function of the 
female labor force participation rate. 
3.2 Two Additional Estimations  
Before concluding the empirical estimation section of the study, the 
results of two additional estimates may be of interest. In the first of these 
additional estimates, the key explanatory variable, the female labor force 
participation rate, is expressed in non-linear terms. In particular, in 
equation (11), in order to further test the strength of the basic hypothesis, 
the variable FLFPRjt-1 is replaced by it its square, i.e., by (FLFPRjt-1 X 
FLFPRjt-1), or simply the term FLFPRSQjt-1: 𝑉𝑃𝑅!"  =  𝑥! + 𝑥! 𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑄!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐻𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑌!"!!  + 𝑥! 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑀!"!! + 𝑥! 𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝑅𝑌!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝐷!" + 𝑥! 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝐸𝐿!"  +  𝑥!"  𝐼𝑁𝐶150𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆!"!!                        + 𝑥!!  𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑆!"  + 𝜖!"          (12) 
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The Hausman (1978) specification test reveals a p-value = 0.0687, so that 
the study adopts the Random Effects Model rather than the Fixed Effects 
Model. The VIF test statistics are provided in Table 6, and they indicate 
the absence of a multi-collinearity problem because they are all lower than 
4.0 in magnitude, as is explained in a variety of authoritative sources 
(Greene 2012; Kennedy, 2003; O’Brien 2007; Rogerson 2001).  
Table	6.	The	Variance	Inflation	Factors	
Variable    VIF  
FLFPRSQ 1.77 
COLLGRAD 3.67 
HSONLY 2.78 
UNRATE 1.72 
HISP 1.83 
AFROAM 1.53 
SANCTUARY 1.66 
EMCHARGED 1.07 
CLOSE-EL 1.03 
INC150PLUS 2.77 
OTHERMSRS 1.07 
N = 250                                                                                     
  
The Random Effects estimation of equation (12) is shown in Table 7. As 
shown, the estimated coefficient in variable FLFPRSQjt-1 is positive, as 
hypothesized, and statistically significant at the 5% level, providing 
further evidence of a link between voter turnout and female labor force 
participation.  
Table	 7.	 Cross	 Section	Random	Effects	 Estimation,	 FLFPR	Variable	 Squared,	 Equation	
(12):	LHS	=	VPR	 	 	
Explanatory Variables: Coefficient St. Err. t-value Prob 
FLFPRSQ 0.0048** 0.00203 2.35 0.0197 
COLLGRAD 1.009*** 0.1517 6.65 0.0000 
HSONLY 0.435*** 0.1672 2.6 0.0098 
UNRATE 0.566*** 0.1907 2.97 0.0033 
HISP -0.147** 0.0689 -2.13 0.0344 
AFROAM 0.034 0.0699 0.49 0.6243 
SANCTUARY 0.179** 0.0796 2.24 0.0259 
EMCHARGED 0.792 0.6315 1.25 0.2111 
CLOSE-EL 2.496*** 0.6256 3.99 0.0001 
INC150PLUS -0.344*** 0.1121 -3.07 0.0024 
OTHERMSRS -0.1098 0.0841 -1.31 0.1930 
Constant -3.99 
   Periods, 5: 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 
    F-Statistic = 12.50** 
    R2 = 0.53 
    Hausman 0.0687 
   ***Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level;	**statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	
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Finally, in the interest of providing possible further insight into the 
(FLFPR/VPR) hypothesis, the basic model in equation (11) is now altered 
in two ways. First, it is modified by the addition of a second measure of 
female labor force participation, namely, the female labor force 
participation rate for those age 65 and above, FLFPR65PLUSjt-1. Second, 
the newly modified model, provided below, is estimated in semi-log form 
to facilitate the ease associated with interpretation: 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑉𝑃𝑅!")  =  𝑥! + 𝑥! 𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐻𝑆𝑂𝑁𝐿𝑌!"!!  + 𝑥! 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑃!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑀!"!! + 𝑥! 𝑆𝐴𝑁𝐶𝑇𝑈𝐴𝑅𝑌!"!!  +  𝑥! 𝐸𝑀𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐺𝐸𝐷!" + 𝑥! 𝐶𝐿𝑂𝑆𝐸 − 𝐸𝐿!"  +  𝑥!"  𝐼𝑁𝐶150𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆!"!!   + 𝑥!!  𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑆𝑅𝑆!"  +  𝑥!"  𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑅65𝑃𝐿𝑈𝑆!"!! + 𝜖!"           (13) 
 
The VIFs for this particular specification are provided in Table 8, where 
multi-collinearity is shown not to be a problem. It is noteworthy that this 
study does not provide the correlation matrices. This is because the 
Variance Inflation Factors provide more comprehensive information than 
simple correlation coefficients. 
Table	8.	The	Variance	Inflation	Factors	
Variable VIF 
FLFPR 2.08 
COLLGRAD 3.90 
HSONLY 2.82 
UNRATE 1.72 
HISP 1.85 
AFROAM 1.56 
SANCTUARY 1.68 
EMCHARGED 1.07 
CLOSE-EL 1.04 
INC150PLUS 2.77 
OTHERMSRS 1.07 
FLFPR65PLUS 1.57 
N = 250 
  
The semi-log estimate of equation (13) is provided in Table 9, where, 
although the additional variable (FLFPR65PLUSjt-1) is not statistically 
significant, the coefficient on the FLFPRjt-1 variable is statistically 
significant at the 1% level yet again. Moreover, based on this estimate, 
other things held constant, a one unit (one percentage point) higher level 
for the female labor force participation rate in state j in year t-1 is 
associated with a 0.61% higher overall voter participation rate (among 
eligible voters) in the state in year t 
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Table	 9.	 Cross	 Section	 Random	 Effects	 Estimation,	 Semi-log	 Specification,	 Equation	
(13):	LHS	=	Log	(VPR)	
Explanatory	Variables:	 Coefficient	 St.	Err.	 t-value	 Prob.	
FLFPR	 0.0061***	 0.0021	 2.8300	 0.0051	
COLLGRAD	 0.0186***	 0.0027	 6.9200	 0.0000	
HSONLY	 0.0082***	 0.0029	 2.8500	 0.0047	
UNRATE	 0.0095***	 0.0033	 2.8800	 0.0044	
HISP	 -0.0021*	 0.0012	 -1.8000	 0.0734	
AFROAM	 0.0006	 0.0012	 0.5000	 0.6179	
SANCTUARY	 0.0029**	 0.0014	 2.1000	 0.0368	
CLOSE-EL	 0.0382***	 0.0108	 3.5400	 0.0005	
EMCHARGED	 0.0121	 0.0109	 1.1100	 0.2687	
INC150PLUS	 -0.0061***	 0.0019	 -3.1400	 0.0019	
OTHERMSRS	 -0.0019	 0.0014	 -1.3600	 0.1745	
FLFPR65PLUS	 0.0072	 0.0054	 1.3300	 0.1844	
Constant	 2.81	
	 	 	Periods,	5:	2000,	2004,	2008,	2012,	2016	
	 	 	 	N	=	250	
	 	 	 	F-Statistic	=	11.23**	
	 	 	 	R2	=	0.53	
	 	 	 	Hausman	 	 0.0744	
	 	 	***Statistically	significant	at	the	1%	level;	**statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	
4 Conclusions 
This empirical study has investigated a state-level panel dataset for the 
five most recent U.S. Presidential elections, namely, the election cycles 
corresponding to the years 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016, years for 
which all data needed to reflect all of the variables in the model are 
available. The principal focus of this study has been on the impact of the 
female labor force participation rate on the voter participation rate, the 
(FLFPR/VPR) hypothesis. In particular, it is hypothesized, for various 
reasons outlined in Section II of this study, that the higher the female labor 
force participation rate, the higher the overall voter participation rate of 
eligible voters. Three Random Effects estimations provide strong 
empirical evidence that the higher the female labor force participation 
rate, ceteris paribus, the higher the aggregate voter participation rate. 
Moreover, robustness testing affirms the strength and consistency of these 
findings. Interestingly, the female labor force participation rate has been 
used as a control variable in three prior studies (Verba et al. 1997; Cebula 
2004; Cebula and Meads 2008). In the first of these studies (Verba et al. 
1997), which involved data for the 1992 election cycle, female labor force 
participation was not found to significantly raise aggregate voter turnout 
(or women’s engagement in political activities). In a time series study of 
the period 1960-2006, Cebula (2004) found the first difference of the female 
labor force participation rate to elevate the percentage voter turnout. The 
third of these studies (Cebula and Meads 2008) uses the female labor force 
participation rate as a control variable in a cross-section investigation of 
the impact of the Electoral College and political party dominance on the 
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2004 general election, finding a positive and statistically impact thereof 
upon voter turnout. These three studies involved estimations of 
rudimentary models by Ordinary Least Squares. By contrast, the present 
study uses a five-year panel dataset as well as Cross Section Random 
Effects estimation; moreover, it also uses more recent data and involves 
more observations. These distinctions between the present study and these 
previous studies notwithstanding, however, it appears that there is a 
compatibility of our findings with two of these three earlier papers. 
In any case, this study has sought to contribute to the expanding 
insights into voter behavior already found in a growing literature. 
Regarding the female labor force participation rate, the national data 
suggest that this measure of labor market activity for the U.S. as a whole 
may have, at least for the time being, effectively stabilized in recent years 
(Council of Economic Advisors 2013, Table B-39). Nevertheless, there is 
considerable variation in this variable across the states, as the descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 1 demonstrate. One interesting implication of the 
findings in this study applies especially to those candidates for elected 
office who reside in states with higher and/or growing female labor force 
participations rates. Namely, it may become increasingly necessary to be 
sensitive to the needs of women and working women especially when 
campaigning for their support, i.e., votes (Barone and Cohen 2006 and 
2010; Barone and McCutcheon 2013). 
In closing, despite the strength and consistency of the results, it is 
obvious that further work on this topic would need to be undertaken 
before a definitive interpretation of the hypothesis can be made. For 
example, a panel data analysis involving mid-term elections rather than 
Presidential elections could be undertaken. Clearly, if it were to yield 
results compatible with those in the present study, then the (FLFPR/VPR) 
hypothesis would have greater credibility.   
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